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Abstract 
Professor Bennett Gershman has written extensively about the role of 
prosecutors as “ministers of justice.”  Where others question or criticize 
the concept, he has found meaning in it.  This essay in his honor briefly 
highlights his work on this theme and then offers additional reflections on 
the concept of prosecutors as ministers of justice. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts and professional associations have described prosecutors as “ministers 
of justice.”1  That is what distinguishes prosecutors from other lawyers.  For criminal 
justice to be administered fairly, it is essential for prosecutors to act in conformity 
with this role.  But one might fairly ask, what does it mean to say that prosecutors 
are “ministers of justice”? 
Some scholars challenge the utility of the concept or criticize it as being vague 
to the point of it being meaningless.2  But over the course of three decades of writings 
examining the work of prosecutors, Professor Bennett Gershman has taken the 
concept to heart. He seeks to imbue it with meaning in order to guide prosecutors 
and to provide a basis for critiquing them when they fall short.  His writings build 
on his inside knowledge as a former Manhattan prosecutor, but also bring to the task 
the critical eye and analytical rigor of an academic.3 
* Gary R. Trombley Family White Collar Crime Research Professor and Professor of Law,
Stetson University College of Law.  The author thanks Professors Bruce Green, Peter Joy, Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, and of course, most importantly Professor Bennett Gershman. 
1 E.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8 cmt (Am. Bar Ass’n, 2015) (“A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”) (emphasis 
added). 
2 See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and 
Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301 (1996) (discussing critically the history and use 
of the phrase “minister of justice”). 
3 Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor as “Minister of Justice,” 60 N.Y. ST. B. J. 8 (1998). 
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This essay, in deserving tribute to Professor Gershman and his scholarly career, 
begins by highlighting some of his insights about prosecutors as ministers of justice, 
follows by adding some further thoughts of my own, and concludes with brief 
reflections. 
II. PROFESSOR GERSHMAN ON “MINISTERS OF JUSTICE”
Throughout his career as a scholar, Professor Gershman has reminded 
prosecutors of their role as ministers of justice and of the significance of this role. 
His earliest work on the topic is a 1988 bar journal article, written when he was an 
adjunct professor. His latest work appeared in a chapter of his 2017 book, The 
Prosecution Stories.4  In between, recognizing the importance of the concept, 
Professor Gershman emphasized prosecutors’ unique role in an impactful article in 
the early 1990s on changes to the nature of criminal prosecution,5 and he selected 
“the prosecutor as a minister of justice” as the theme of his 2011 tribute to the late 
Fred Zacharias, another giant in our field.6  This theme is no less fitting for an essay 
honoring Professor Gershman. 
Professor Gershman’s 1988 bar journal article, titled, The Prosecutor as 
“Minister of Justice,” recognized that the Supreme Court, having lost interest in 
criminal defendants’ fair process rights, could no longer be counted on to regularly 
issue opinions protecting criminal defendants from abuses of state power as it had 
during the years of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution.7  But this did 
not mean that prosecutors should be allowed to exploit their considerable power. 
Rather, Professor Gershman was among the first to identify prosecutorial discretion, 
left virtually unrestricted by the Supreme Court, as a criminal procedure subject of 
particular concern given the possibilities for abuse.8  He called on trial courts to 
“exercise more vigilance and control” in overseeing prosecutorial discretion.9  He 
4 BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, The Prosecutor as a Minister of Justice, in PROSECUTION STORIES 
263–85 (2017) (providing stories of cases that he declined to prosecute and that might be considered 
by some as cases that he lost). 
5 Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393 (1992) (noting changes 
that occurred to the prosecutor’s role). 
6 See Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 151 (2011) (providing a tribute to Fred Zacharias and his work pertaining to prosecutors as 
ministers of justice). 
7 See Gershman, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing a post-Mapp, Huntley and Wade environment). 
8 Professor Gershman states that “[n]o area of criminal justice is more complex and 
controversial than that of the prosecutor’s discretion, particularly as it relates to charging, plea 
bargaining, dismissing, and granting immunity.” Id. at 63.   
9 Id. 
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also called on “[c]ourts and bar associations . . . to send out better messages, and 
provide stronger incentives for prosecutors to behave fairly.”10 
A few years later, in his 1991–92 article on “the new prosecutors,” Professor 
Gershman described how prosecutors had acquired increased power, “more 
insulat[ion] from judicial control over their conduct,” and increasing immunity from 
ethical restraints.11  Attributing these changes to the then-prevalent crime-control 
environment,12 he provided examples of “a radical skewing of the balance of 
advantage in the criminal justice system in favor of the state.”13  He questioned 
whether U.S. prosecutors can be the ministers of justice in this environment or 
whether they can “‘temper zeal with human kindness’ as Justice Jackson 
recommended,”14 and he called for the “[e]quilibrium [to be] restored because the 
prosecutor, with the power of the state behind him or her, should not have this unfair 
advantage.”15  He warned that “[g]iven the well-documented existence of 
[prosecutorial] misconduct, the current laissez-faire attitude of the courts, and the 
disappointing response of professional grievance committees, there is a potential for 
even greater misuse.”16 
In his 2011 tribute to Professor Zacharias, Professor Gershman returned to the 
minister-of-justice theme.17  He expressed appreciation for Professor Fred 
Zacharias’s “faith that the adversarial system has the capacity to correct itself and 
that prosecutors have the courage and integrity to step out of their purely adversarial 
roles and ensure that justice is done.”18  But Professor Gershman advocated a less 
“romantic” and more forceful approach to ensuring proper prosecutorial conduct. 
Most recently, Professor Gershman’s 2017 book, Prosecution Stories, 
described his experiences as a Manhattan prosecutor in cases presenting ethical and 
professional dilemmas.  A chapter titled, The Prosecutor as a Minister of 
10  Gershman notes that “if the prosecutor were forced to appear before the appellate tribunal to 
defend his or her conduct, the incidence of courtroom misconduct might diminish.”  Id. at 64.   
11  Gershman, supra note 5, at 393. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. at 394. 
14  Id. at 457. 
15  Id. at 394. 
16  Id. at 458. 
17  See Gershman, supra note 6. 
18  Id. at 155. 
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Justice,19and subtitled Fair Blows and Foul Blows20 contains stories about 
“confessing error,” handling a case when the accused is innocent of the charges, 
moving to dismiss a case that is not legally supported, and handling cases that are 
not supported by enough evidence to obtain a conviction.  In each instance, Professor 
Gershman made the right call, sometimes overcoming obstacles placed in his path.  
For example, he describes persuading a court to dismiss a case over the court’s initial 
resistance.  What is particularly important in these examples is that the ethics rules 
did not dictate the right course of action.  The prosecutor was called on to exercise 
discretion wisely, often when facing adversity from a judge or others.21  The 
prosecution might be described as “losing” each of the cases in the chapter.  But the 
stories illustrate that successfully “doing justice” does not always mean securing a 
conviction.  While Professor Gershman’s earlier writings educated prosecutors 
about how to fulfill their role as ministers of justice while encouraging judicial 
oversight to assure that prosecutors stay within the appropriate legal and ethical 
lines, the book chapter contributes something more: it offers stories that can be used 
for teaching and reflecting on how a prosecutor, making discretionary decisions, 
resolves hard questions as a “minister of justice.”22 
III. FURTHER THOUGHTS ON PROSECUTORS AS “MINISTERS OF JUSTICE”
Professor Gershman has not written the last word on the implications of the 
prosecutor’s role as “minister of justice” and no one could.  Continued thinking is 
warranted in light of ongoing changes in the criminal process and in the nature of 
criminal prosecution.  Frustration with the “minister of justice” concept is 
understandable.  Like defense lawyers, prosecutors are advocates in the criminal 
justice process,23 but they have further responsibilities to ensure the fairness of the 
criminal justice process that makes them different from one-sided advocates.24  The 
prosecutor represents the public25 and has a responsibility to assure a fair process for 
19  GERSHMAN, supra note 4, at 263–85. 
20  Id. at 263.  (Professor Gershman notes the source of this terminology from Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))(“while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones”). 
21  Id. 
22  See Bruce A. Green & Samuel Levine, Disciplinary Regulations of Prosecutors as a Remedy 
for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 143 (2016) (looking at the best ways to regulate prosecutorial discretion).
23   MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8, cmt (Am. Bar Ass’n, 2015). 
24  Id.  (stating that “[t]his responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and 
that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”) 
25  STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“[T]he prosecutor 
generally serves the public and not any particular government agency, law enforcement officer or unit, 
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the accused.26  How one reconciles these responsibilities is sometimes clear, but 
prosecutors can face hard questions in all aspects of their work.27  Sometimes 
prosecutors respond by relying on gut instinct,28 making decisions for reasons that 
are unarticulated or not fully articulated.  But one cannot assume that prosecutors 
have such well-refined instincts that, without training and conscious deliberation, 
they can be counted on to act wisely. 
At the very least, prosecutors must comply with the law and ethics rules, and 
those who fail to do so cannot fairly call themselves “ministers of justice.”29 
Prosecutors’ professional misconduct is well documented and described in Professor 
Bennett Gershman’s book, Prosecutorial Misconduct.30  Sadly, in the quest to win 
convictions, prosecutors have crossed the lines in a host of ways.31  The list of 
improprieties includes Brady violations in failing to turn over favorable evidence to 
the defense,32 using pretextual peremptory challenges in jury selection to foster 
witness or victim.  When investigating or prosecuting a criminal matter, the prosecutor does not 
represent law enforcement personnel who have worked on the matter and such law enforcement 
personnel are not the prosecutor’s clients . . .”).  This Standard differs from the Standard used in the 
Third Edition of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards which stated that “[A] prosecutor’s client is the 
people who live in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.” STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,  § 3-1.3 cmt. (AM 
BAR ASS’N 1993). 
26  E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8(b) (AM BAR ASS’N 2015) (stating that 
prosecutors shall “make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, 
and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain 
counsel.”). 
27  See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the 
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2009). (nothing that  in examining 
the role of a “minister of justice” one needs to not only look at prosecutors’ pre-trial and trial conduct, 
but also at their post-conviction conduct.) 
28  See Bruce A..Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice,” 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 
608 (1999) (noting that in discussing the prosecutor’s job to “do justice,” that “[s]ometimes the concept 
was implicit in the way a senior lawyer worked through a hard question with a new prosecutor: What, 
she might ask, was the right thing to do?”) 
29  See Abbe Smith, Can You Be A Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 355, 376–77 (2001) (discussing the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice); Fred C. Zacharias, 
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 
45, 103 (1991) (examining the “do justice mandate”). 
30  See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed. 2015–16). 
31  See Kenneth Bresler, “I Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal 
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 546 (1996) (“When prosecutors count convictions, they are 
hardly wearing the mantle of power humbly.”); see also Peter A. Joy, Prosecution Clinics: Dealing 
With Professional Role, 74 MISS. L.J. 955, 958 (noting how a prosecutor should not be merely an 
“advocate focused on winning each case,” but that the prosecutor also has the role of being a “minister 
of justice.”). 
32  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that prosecutors are required to provide 
to defense counsel evidence favorable to the accused). The ethics rule on providing exculpatory 
evidence to the defense is stricter in stating that in a criminal case, the prosecutor shall “make timely 
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racial bias,33 and trial improprieties that can taint the trial process,34 such as 
commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial.35  Prosecutors’ unethical 
conduct has gained public notoriety, such as the case of the wrongful prosecution of 
Duke lacrosse players in North Carolina.36  Changes in the law have also resulted, 
as seen following the Michael Morton case in Texas.37 
One hard question, addressed in many of Professor Gershman’s writings, is 
how to prevent or punish prosecutorial misconduct.  In August 2018, New York 
became the first state to establish a commission to investigate complaints of 
prosecutorial misconduct—an idea that Professor Gershman had advocated for in 
his writing for more than four years.38 
Equally hard are the questions involving prosecutorial conduct that are not 
forbidden by the law or ethics rules but that may still fall short of what is or should 
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the 
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor.” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8 (AM BAR ASS’N 1983).  It does note that the prosecutor is relieved 
of this responsibility when the prosecutor has “a protective order of the tribunal.” Id. Many cases since 
Brady had expounded upon the responsibilities of the prosecution.  See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (holding that the prosecutor’s discovery obligations include impeachment 
material).  But Brady violations continue to infect the criminal justice system.  See generally Bruce 
Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51 (2016) 
(discussing Brady violations and how the information age has changed prosecutorial accountability). 
33  See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1768 (2016) (striking of black prospective 
jurors denied the defendant of constitutional rights); see also Ellen S. Podgor, The Role of the 
Prosecution and Defense Function Standards: Stagnant or Progressive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1173 
(2011) (discussing the writing of the criminal justice standard on requiring prosecutors not to strike 
jurors premised on sexual orientation). 
34  BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, Prosecutorial Misconduct (2d ed. 2015–16) (examining all aspects 
of prosecutorial misconduct); see also Ellen S. Podgor & Jeffrey S. Weiner, Prosecutorial Misconduct: 
Alive and Well, and Living in Indiana?, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 657 (1990) (providing examples of 
different types of prosecutorial misconduct that has occurred in criminal trials). 
35  See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that it is violation of defendant’s 
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination rights when a prosecutor comments on the accused failure to 
testify). 
36  See generally Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke LaCrosse Case, Innocence, and False 
Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007) (discussing 
prosecutor Michael Nifong’s actions in the Duke lacrosse case). 
37  See Gerald S. Reamey, The Truth Might Set You Free: How the Michael Morton Act Could 
Fundamentally Change Texas Criminal Discovery, or Not, 48 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 893, 899 (2016) 
(discussing the actions of former District Attorney Ken Anderson in his handling of the case of Michael 
Morton; a case that resulted in Anderson being removed from the bench as a judge and being sentenced 
to ten days in prison). 
38  See Bennett L. Gershman, New Commission to Regulate Prosecutorial Misconduct, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2014, 12:09 PM) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/bennett-l-
gershman/new-commission-to-prosecutorial-misconduct_b_5353570.html. 
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be expected of a “minister of justice.”  The normative expectations are not always 
clear and certainly not set in stone.  This is where the important analytic work must 
be done by academics and members of the legal profession, to help prosecutors and 
the public understand where the lines should be drawn. 
Prosecutors are expected to exercise sound judgment and a sense of 
proportionality.  This can be seen when examining prosecutors who bring criminal 
charges that they believe the law permits, without first considering whether 
prosecution, or the harshest prosecution, is truly necessary.39  Former Attorney 
General Ashcroft took this approach by requiring prosecutors to charge the highest 
possible offense without consideration of whether that offense was the most 
appropriate for the defendant.40  Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions appears to 
have followed suit, although perhaps allowing federal prosecutors slightly more 
flexibility.41  A prosecutor is not a true “minister of justice” when their rigid 
approach to charging crimes takes no account of potential defendants’ individual 
circumstances.  Prosecutors should make an individualized assessment of each 
defendant’s conduct and characteristics, to determine the defendant’s level of moral 
culpability and the extent to which a prosecution will serve the need for punishment. 
Merely matching people’s conduct to the elements of a criminal statute may offer 
insight into whether the law has been broken, but it does not answer the question 
whether that individual should be prosecuted. 
There is a premium on prosecutors’ sound exercise of discretion, with an eye 
toward the public interest and the legitimate objectives of the criminal process.  In 
exercising discretion, prosecutors must avoid the temptation to placate a victim or 
to promote their own reputation (such as by garnering favorable publicity) or their 
careers (such as, in the case of elected prosecutors, by making decisions simply 
39  See Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461 
(2009) (discussing problems with merely matching conduct to statutes). 
40  See Memorandum from Att’y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policy 
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing, (Sept. 22, 2003), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm; Alan Vinegrad, The Sessions 
Memo: Back to the Past? THE VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (May 25, 2017), 
https://www.vera.org/blog/the-sessions-memo-back-to-the-past (discussing how Attorney General 
Sessions is moving away from the policy of the Obama Administration that focused on prosecutors 
using an “individualized assessment” in charging). 
41  See Memorandum from Att’y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Charging and 
Sentencing Policy, (May 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download 
(“prosecutors should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense.”)  The Memo does 
note an exception in stating that “[t]here will be circumstances in which good judgment would lead a 
prosecutor to conclude that a strict application of the above charging policy is not warranted.”  The 
Memo states that such deviations from the strict standard require higher approvals and “the reasons 
must be documented in the file.”  Id. 
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because they will be popular).42  Not every case deserves to be prosecuted, not even 
when prosecutors are convinced of a person’s guilt and convinced they can prove it. 
Prosecutors must decide which among these cases to prosecute based on sound 
reasoning. The law rarely dictates their decisions: Prosecutions are rarely dismissed 
for impermissible selectivity.43  Moreover, legislatures’ tendency to write too many 
criminal laws gives prosecutors too many statutes from which to choose.44  When 
the cases prosecutors investigate turn out to be too hard to prove or too complicated 
to explain to jurors,45 prosecutors can be tempted to take shortcuts, prosecuting 
people for false statements,46 perjury47 or obstruction of justice.48 
The minister of justice role also calls for a sense of fair play, and prosecutors 
acknowledge this to varying degrees.  With respect to some areas of conduct, 
Department of Justice policy gives expression to prosecutors’ roles as “ministers of 
justice” by recognizing the need for self-imposed obligations and self-restraint 
beyond what the law demands.  For example, the Supreme Court has found that 
prosecutors, in seeking an indictment, have no obligation to alert the grand jury to 
exculpatory evidence.49  Department of Justice guidelines nevertheless call upon 
federal prosecutors to be candid with the grand jury, recognizing that, as a matter of 
procedural fairness, the grand jury should be apprised of important exculpatory 
evidence so that it can make a well-informed decision whether to indict, and that a 
42  Campaign pledges to prosecute certain individuals can be equally offensive.  See Peter A. 
Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Campaign Pledges to Prosecute, 21 CRIM. JUST. 40 (2007) (discussing 
the conflict of interest issues arising from campaign pledges to prosecute). 
43  See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding that selective prosecution 
claims required a showing that the government’s decision “had a discriminatory effect and that it was 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”). 
44  See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM U. L. REV. 703 (2005) 
(discussing the increasing number of federal statutes and the problems of overcriminalization). 
45  See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Shortcuts, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 925 (2018) (discussing the 
use of shortcut offenses in prosecuting white collar crime). 
46  There are many “false statement” statutes in the federal code, including false statements on 
tax returns (26 U.S.C. § 7206 (2018)), false statements related to the sale of any mortgage to a bank 
(18 U.S.C. § 1011 (2018)), and the generic false statement statute (18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018)). 
47    Prosecutors often use charges of perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2018)) or false declarations (18 
U.S.C. § 1623 (2018)), as these offenses can be easier to prove. 
48  “It is often easier for the government to prove the destruction of documents, lying to 
investigators, or lying to a grand jury, then to present fraudulent complicated financial transactions.” 
PODGOR ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME  167 (2d ed. 2018) (providing a comprehensive review of the 
law of obstruction of justice). 
49  According to the Supreme Court, presenting exculpatory material to a grand jury is not 
constitutionally required.  See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992). 
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prosecutor who withholds such evidence, though law-abiding, is not acting as a 
minister of justice. 50 
Prosecutorial self-restraint is also called for when a person’s guilt is uncertain 
and when the evidence is not strong enough to make a conviction likely.  Prosecutors 
don’t always recognize this approach.  As United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, James B. Comey reportedly challenged prosecutors to bring 
cases, branding those who were fearful of proceeding with difficult cases because of 
a possible loss, as members of the “chickenshit club.”51  While he was correct that 
prosecutors should not be preoccupied with securing convictions,52 one might 
challenge his premise that prosecutors should bring weak cases, thereby employing 
the criminal process as punishment for those unlikely to be convicted.53 
Professor Gershman’s 2017 collection of prosecution stories illustrates the 
importance of assessing individuals’ guilt. For example, he describes how in 
prosecutions arising out of student demonstrations at Columbia University in the late 
1960s, the evidence was deficient because the “officers who entered the buildings 
50  The Department of Justice U.S. Attorneys Manual instructs its attorneys “that when a 
prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence that directly 
negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose 
such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person.”  U.S DEPT. OF
JUSTICE,. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-11.233 (2018).  This guideline, however, is not enforceable at law 
and merely internal department guidance.  See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-
1.200 (2018).  See also Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary 
Justice,” 13 CORNELL J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 167 (2004) (discussing enhanced compliance with 
Department of Justice guidelines); Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1971) (discussing the reasons for having Justice 
Department guidelines as non-mandatory). 
51  See JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES ch. 5 (2017) (discussing then-United States Attorney James Comey’s initial 
speech to his prosecutor’s calling those who had not lost cases as members of the “chickenshit club.” 
He stated, “[i]f it’s a good case and the evidence supports it, you must bring it.”). 
52  Jesse Eisinger writes that James B. Comey called for prosecutors to be “righteous, not 
careerist.”  Eisinger wrote that “[v]ictory in the courtroom should be a secondary concern, meaning 
that government lawyers should neither seek to win at all costs nor duck a valid case out of fear of 
losing.”  Id. 
53  Bringing cases with weak or limited admissible evidence may be considered acceptable by 
some, so long as the prosecutor believes in the guilt of the accused and has probable cause for the 
bringing of the charges.  ABA standards however, seem to counter that position and only provide for 
“Minimum Requirements for Filing and Maintaining Criminal Charges.”  Specifically, the 
“Prosecution Standard” provides that “a prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the 
prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by probable cause, that admissible 
evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to 
charge is in the interests of justice.”  See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, Prosecution Standard § 3-
4.3(a) (AM BAR ASS’N 2015) (emphasis added).  Additionally, there is the further minimum 
requirement that “[a]fter criminal charges are filed, a prosecutor should maintain them only if the 
prosecutor continues to reasonably believe that probable cause exists and that admissible evidence will 
be sufficient to support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at Standard 3-4.3(b). 
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and removed the students were not the same ones who then took custody of the 
persons arrested” and placed them in buses transporting them downtown for arrest.54 
These cases presented a challenge to the local prosecutors, who fulfilled their 
obligations as “ministers of justice” by moving to dismiss the cases prior to trial, 
recognizing that no legitimate purpose would be served by prolonging prosecutions 
that would eventually fail. 
Even when far more significant wrongdoing occurs, it is inappropriate to 
proceed with a prosecution when there is good reason to doubt the defendant’s 
culpability.55  One should not be bullied into thinking that they are a member of a 
disdained “chickenshit club” when they decide not to prosecute a weak or doubtful 
case.  A trial inflicts pain on the defendant and a cost on the public.  The collateral 
consequences of trials, irrespective of the verdict, can be devastating to an individual 
or entity.  Jobs may be lost, families may be torn apart, assets may be eaten up in 
legal fees, and companies may be thrown into bankruptcy.  Of course, if a conviction 
results, the direct and collateral consequences can be even more severe.56  
Prosecutors have a duty to avoid not only wrongful convictions but also wrongful 
prosecutions. 
54  Id. at 282. 
55  See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 309, 342–52 (2001) (discussing how prosecutors “should have the courage to decline 
prosecution if he entertains a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.”). 
56  See, e.g., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CENTER, http://ccresourcecenter.org/ (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2018); JUSTICE CENTER NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONVICTION, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2018); OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION, https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/pages/collateral-consequences-
inventory.aspx. (last visited Aug. 15, 2018). 
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IV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
Professor Gershman deserves to be celebrated for his devotion to the 
prosecutor’s role as a “minister of justice.”  His work as a law professor and scholar 
in educating future and current “ministers of justice” serves an important purpose.  
Among other things, his work helps counterbalance the overly harsh “crime control” 
mentality that leads some prosecutors to focus more on ridding the streets of 
criminals than on assuring that the individuals being prosecuted are in fact the guilty 
parties and deserving of punishment.  He has helped clarify the lines between proper 
and improper prosecutorial behavior and demonstrated the need to deter and 
sanction improper behavior.  By magnifying the importance and complexity of 
prosecutors’ work, he has inspired others to speak and write on the importance of 
“”what would a “minister of justice” do” in various situations.”  More needs to be 
written on this question.  Fortunately, Professor Gershman has shown no sign of 
slowing down.  Both the profession and academy will be well served if Professor 
Gershman continues providing history, cases, stories and analyses of prosecutors’ 
role as “ministers of justice” for many more years to come. 
